There is a school of thought that says nuclear weapons made
the cold war safer by making the costs of conflict unthinkable. The idea is that because a nuclear war would
be so devastating no rational leader would ever order their use. Overall I agree that nuclear weapons reduced
the odds of full scale conflict between the US and the USSR but I take issue
with the idea that that was a sure thing.
While both sides were clearly terrified of the consequences of a nuclear
war miscalculations and misinformation brought the two super powers to the
brink on multiple occasions.
Even if
we were to assume for a moment that the theory is correct and not leader would
ever issue orders for a first strike there is still the problem of
misinformation. In fact misinformation
has brought us closer to nuclear war than most people realize. In 1983 a soviet early warning system
detected the launch of an American ICBM.
Luckily the commander on duty decided that it was a mistake and did not
sound the alarm. One false alarm would
have been worrying enough but over the course of several minuets the satellite
detected four more launches. Humanity’s
luck held and the commander decided to consider these false alarms as well. The timing of this incident, a few weeks
after the soviets shot down a passenger plane and during the heightened tensions
of the Regan era, made it particularly dangerous. These heightened tensions meant that the USSR
was in a high state of alert and would have launched a “second strike” immediately
if the commander had trusted his equipment.
Some might say that it was fear of nuclear war that prevented it that
day and that this is proof of the power of MAD.
While I think the seriousness of the consequences encouraged him to err
on the side of caution they were not the deciding factor. More important was the unlikely pattern of
the launches (firing a few missiles one by one instead of by the hundreds) and
earlier worries that the equipment was faulty.
If this was not the case and the satellite had shown hundreds or even a
few dozen launches things would have played out differently that day.
The
second incident has to do with miscalculation.
During the Cuban Missile crisis a number of soviet submarines were equipped
with fleet destroying nuclear torpedoes and sent to Cuba in defiance of the American
blockade. American harassment forced the
subs to stay below the surface for days before dropping warning grenades. The submariners believed that they were under
attack and some thought that nuclear war had already begun. Ultimately they had to choose between surrender
or attack. One of the sub commanders chose
to use the nuclear torpedoes. Luckily
the fleet commander vetoed his decision against the wishes of many of the men
and they surrendered. The soviet leadership
had made a serious mistake in sending nuclear armed subs into a known blockade
that was fully capable of forcing them to surface and had clearly stated its
intention to do so. The submariners did
not fully understand their situation and the Americans harassing them were
completely oblivious to the sub’s armament.
Had the man who gave the order or one of the other supporters of attack been
the fleet commander the Cuban missile crisis would have ended differently. In the best case scenario the use of the sub’s
nuclear torpedoes against a military target out in the ocean could have been
dealt with diplomatically without starting a full nuclear war but that is by no
means a certainty. And what if the sub
had been armed with nuclear missiles rather than torpedoes? Many
on the sub believed that nuclear war had already started and wanted to get their
shot off rather than surrender. What
difference would it have made to them if the nukes they launched hit ships or
cities?
MAD may
make people more restrained in their actions but it is no guarantor of
peace. The fact that we survived the
cold war is thanks to luck not fate and if we draw the wrong lesson from our
survival, if we choose to believe that nukes make us safer, one day our luck
may run out.
The argument that MAD could be undermined by accidents, technical faults or miscalculation at the field commander level is a good one. However, nuclear deterrence may be enhanced by increasing the risk of such calculation as long as this fact is advertised to the opponent. For example, in time of war control over launching tactical nuclear weapons falls upon field commanders in France (much as in your Soviet nuclear torpedo example) with the logic being that this added potential for miscalculation actually deters the opponent further. Clearly this exposes both states to a greater risk of miscalculation, but conversely likely encourages leaders to be 'extra' careful.
ReplyDeleteI fully take your point that miscalculation could lead to nuclear war - though I think it is unclear whether the use of a tactical weapon would result in a full strategic exchange. This seems more likely to result by accident through equipment failure etc which could directly impact strategic weapons and/or postures. How far do you think this division between tactical and strategic weapons protects us from unintended consequences?
I certainly agree with you that the use of a tactical weapon would not necessarily lead to nuclear war and I think I mentioned that in my post but then again, given the heightened tensions of the time it could have.
ReplyDeleteI can also imagine a slightly different scenario in which the sub had strategic missiles and there was a disincentive to advertise it.
Say a Soviet ballistic missile sub was at port in Cuba for supplies when the crisis hit. It could have either been caught up in the blockade as it was forming or tried to make a run for the open ocean after it was already in place. The Soviets certainly wouldnt have told the Americans that there was a ballistic missile sub in the area before it was intercepted and the Americans would not have told the Soviets that they were harassing one of their subs. This would bring us back to the scenario I discussed in my post only instead of tactical weapons you would have had strategic ones. I dont know who had authority to launch such missiles but if it was the sub commander I think he would have had many of the the same incentives to use the weapons at his disposal weather they were strategic or tactical (they believed nuclear war had already started so why shouldnt they play their part?).