post 1 Carlton Klein

Hard and Soft Power:

Teasing out the difference in Ukraine

On the face of it the conflict in Ukraine, from its origins with the EU Association Agreement to Russia’s latest incursions, appears to be cleanly divided between the soft power of Europe and the hard power of Russia but when one looks closer the picture becomes much more mixed. 

There is certainly something to this narrative.  The Association Agreement was, for the most part, a consequence of the EU’s soft power.  It does have elements of hard power in that it begins the long process of integrating Ukraine into the EU and includes assistance for some of the mandated reforms but it is by no means a gift.  The real draw was the Western European lifestyle and liberal government; a powerful piece of soft power that the Kremlin was in no position to match.  Instead Russia used hard power in a desperate attempt to keep its former vassal from moving further into Europe’s orbit.  While the details of what Russia did to keep Yanukovych from signing are hazy, hard power in the form of gas discounts and bond purchases were a large part and it is likely a few threats were thrown in for good measure. 

After the Maidan protests and the over through of Yanukovych the picture became more mixed and Russia, Europe and Ukraine began using hard and soft power in their dealings with one another.  When the Maidan protests succeeded the Kremlin pulled its Georgia playbook.  Here the use of soft and hard power became more mixed.  Just as it did in Georgia, Russia used separatism as pretext for its own military action; exploiting the most powerful tool in its soft power arsenal: state media.  Ukraine, however, had learned from the Georgia war and showed admirable restraint.  Instead of using hard power, as Saakashvili had, Ukraine accepted its limitations while managing some impressive acts of soft power such as the peaceful march by a Ukrainian unit in a very public attempt to reoccupy its air force base. 

While the hard power of Russia’s military successfully took control of Crimea and its soft power provided political cover it failed to destabilize Ukraine in a way that would ensure that it would not enter either the EU or NATO.  Determined to succeed Putin chose to use both forms of power in Eastern Ukraine as well.  He used state controlled media to inflame a separatist Russian minority in the East of the country and filled its ranks with Russian advisors and soldiers.  The West was also tentatively using hard power as the US and, to a lesser extent, Europe began imposing sanctions on Putin’s inner circle. 

While most of the power exerted in the Ukrainian crisis has been used deliberately there are two important cases in which Russia has unintentionally weakened its soft power while boosting that of the West.  The most glaring of these is the shooting down of Malaysian airlines flight 17 by separatists near Donetsk.  This was a soft power coup for those in the west who wanted stronger action against Russia.  The second case is more subtle. It is a shift in how the world views Russia, from a state that might be brought closer in to the post WWII order to one that will flout that order in the pursuit of its own interests. 

The simplistic narrative is of Europe using its soft power to draw Ukraine into its orbit but being unwilling to use hard power against an aggressive Russia, and of Russia reactively using hard power because it lacks effective soft power.  There is certainly some truth in this account but the reality is more nuanced.  Both sides have used a variety of hard and soft power to advance their own goals.